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The EU and the Responsibility to Protect in an  
Illiberal Era
Abstract
The 2005 United Nations agreement on the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) populations from 
atrocities was intended to set acceptable boundaries to ‘humanitarian intervention’, but it is still 
extremely controversial and vulnerable in a world of  increasing nationalism and illiberalism. Can the 
European Union help to ‘rescue’ R2P? This paper analyses how the EU has responded in three 
mass atrocity situations: Central African Republic (2012–14); the treatment of  the Rohingya 
minority in Myanmar (2017–), and inter-ethnic violence in South Sudan (2016–). The cases reveal a 
number of  weaknesses in EU responses: it responds to mass atrocities only after violence has 
seriously escalated, and the use of  force to protect populations is still a step too far for many EU 
member states. The EU still lacks institutional mechanisms that incorporate mass atrocity 
prevention in its policymaking processes, but its responses more tellingly reveal the lack of  
commitment to making mass atrocity prevention a priority. The paper sets out several steps the EU 
could take to strengthen its capacity to prevent mass atrocities, if  the member states could agree to 
do so. Yet ultimately, if  the UN Security Council and other regional organisations are not willing to 
take action in response to mass atrocities, the EU on its own will have little influence.
Keywords
European Union; mass atrocities; responsibility to protect; Central African Republic; Myanmar; 
Rohingya; South Sudan
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1. Introduction
This working paper examines the EU’s response to three recent mass atrocity situations. Mass 
atrocities encompass the international crimes of  genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
‘ethnic cleansing’. These are the crimes listed explicitly in the UN’s ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ 
document on the responsibility to protect (R2P). R2P consists of  three main strands: 1) all states 
have a responsibility to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity; 2) the international community should assist states in this duty; and 3) if  a 
state cannot or manifestly fails to protect its population, then the international community should 
do so through any appropriate means (United Nations General Assembly, 2005; paragraphs 138–9). 
The responsibility to protect is emblematic of  multilateral institutionalism, a key element of  the 
liberal world order (Alcaro, 2018: p. 3). For David Rieff, it is also emblematic of  the hubris of  the 
international human rights movement, which assumed linear progress towards an expanded human 
rights regime: “Nowhere has this hubris been more evident than in the fate of  institutional 
structures and frameworks meant to allow internationally sanctioned, state-sponsored intervention 
to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes or to bring to account those guilty of  
such horrors” (Rieff, 2018: p. 18). 
R2P has always been contested. Mass atrocities challenge the strong attachment by states (liberal 
and illiberal) to norms of  non-interference, sovereignty, and the non-use of  force: ‘never again 
Auschwitz’ may require military intervention to stop genocide. R2P was intended to set appropriate 
and acceptable boundaries to ‘humanitarian intervention’, but it is still controversial despite the 
growing number of  references to it in UN Security Council resolutions (Bellamy and Dunne, 2016: 
pp. 10–11; Gifkins, 2016). As nationalism spreads throughout the international system, a norm such 
as R2P is vulnerable. For Rieff  (2018: p. 19), “Both the ICC [International Criminal Court] and R2P 
were, from the beginning, unworkable ideas for the world we live in, one in which authoritarianism 
is growing stronger.”
The UN Security Council has not taken action in several recent atrocity situations, such as Syria. 
Several states such as Burundi and Myanmar have simply refused entry to UN or regional 
organisations’ investigating or monitoring missions, and Burundi withdrew from the International 
Criminal Court after it initiated an investigation into possible crimes against humanity there. So 
even though the number of  deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence has risen since 2010 (Roser, 
2018), the ‘international community’ seems less willing and able to respond than the 2005 R2P 
agreement would imply. 
Could the European Union help to ‘rescue’ R2P? The EU has enormous capacity to assist states 
and societies to build resilience, a wide range of  appropriate policy instruments that can be used in 
responses to mass atrocities, and credibility and legitimacy in the areas of  conflict prevention and 
human rights protection. Its strengths lie in prevention—a key element of  R2P—rather than rapid 
response, as it can be exceedingly difficult for the EU member states and institutions to agree to act 
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rapidly and decisively. Since the publication of  the EU’s Global Strategy (European Union 2016a), 
however, EU member states have taken further steps to boost the EU’s capacity to respond to 
crises, including with military means. But there is no denying that the challenges currently facing the 
EU are grave, from Brexit and divisions over migration, to internal contestation of  core elements 
of  the liberal world order such as human rights and the rule of  law.
The commitment of  EU institutions and member states to pursuing mass atrocity prevention—and 
the protection of  human rights more generally—looks shaky. The Global Strategy shifted the 
portrayal of  the EU as a normative or ethical international actor to one that pursues ‘principled 
pragmatism’ in which the EU’s principles derive not just from ‘idealism’ but from “a realistic 
assessment of  the current strategic context” (European Union, 2016a: p. 8). Yet the current 
strategic context is particularly challenging for promoters of  human rights, including the protection 
of  populations from mass atrocity crimes. So can the EU help strengthen international responses to 
possible or actual mass atrocity situations, or will it mirror international reluctance and/or inability 
to protect populations from mass atrocities? What is at stake is not just the EU’s credibility as an 
ethical international actor or the R2P norm itself, but also the lives of  people at risk of  mass 
atrocities.
To try to answer to these questions, this working paper 
examines the EU’s response to three cases of  mass atrocities: 
inter-ethnic violence in the Central African Republic (2012–
14), the treatment of  the Rohingya minority in Myanmar 
(2017–), and inter-ethnic violence in South Sudan (2016–). In 
all three cases, UN special advisers and other reputable 
‘warners’ (Meyer and Otto, 2016) have warned that mass 
atrocities are occurring. The cases were selected because they 
are not the locations of  intensive outside intervention (as is the case of  the ongoing tragedy in 
Syria), the countries concerned have been the subject of  EU foreign policies before violence 
erupted, and so they are cases where the EU has the potential to have some influence.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides background information on the EU’s 
implementation of  R2P to date. The third section lays out the framework for analysing EU 
responses to mass atrocities. Sections four, five, and six cover the three cases: inter-ethnic violence 
in the Central African Republic (2012–14), treatment of  the Rohingya minority in Myanmar 
(2017–), and inter-ethnic violence in South Sudan (2016–). Section seven concludes the paper.
2. The EU and R2P
The EU has often been referred to as a ‘normative’ or ‘ethical’ power (Aggestam, 2008; Manners, 
2002). There is, however, an extensive literature on the various inconsistencies in EU external 
human rights policies (Brummer, 2009; Del Biondo, 2011; Portela 2018), showing that it is not easy 
for EU member states and institutions to resolve tensions between confronting and engaging 
Mass atrocities challenge the strong 
attachment by states to norms of  
non-interference, sovereignty, and  
the non-use of  force.
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governments over their human rights records, or over the priority that human rights is to be 
accorded in foreign policies. The EU’s engagement with R2P is illustrative of  the reluctance to 
make such hard choices.
The EU has acknowledged that there is a moral obligation to protect people from gross violations 
of  human rights and humanitarian law. In 2006, all three of  the principal EU institutions declared: 
“The EU also strongly supports the responsibility to protect. We cannot stand by, as genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of  international humanitarian law and human 
rights are committed” (European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006: paragraph 37). At the 
June 2018 debate on R2P at the UN General Assembly, the EU ambassador noted that the EU was 
born “in a spirit of  ‘never again’” and so R2P “is at the core of  our primary goal, namely to allow 
our populations to live in peace and security” (European External Action Service, 2018). This 
rhetoric, however, masks the lack of  consensus within the EU over the priority to be accorded to 
mass atrocity prevention and R2P, and the instruments that are to be used in situations where mass 
atrocities are likely or ongoing. The 2016 EU Global Strategy, for example, merely states that the 
“EU will also promote the responsibility to protect”, which is a vague statement that provides no 
concrete commitment as to how the EU will do so (European Union, 2016a: p. 42).
Taking mass atrocity prevention and response seriously entails embedding it in processes and 
institutions. There is no EU equivalent to the principle in Article 4(h) of  the African Union’s 
constitutive act: “The right of  the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of  
the Assembly in respect of  grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.” The fact that EU membership is conditional on respecting human rights and democratic 
principles has been cited as an example of  how the EU implements R2P (de Baere, 2012), but 
taking action against a member state that contravenes such conditions (under Article 7 of  the 
Lisbon Treaty) has already been shown to be difficult, as in the recent cases of  Hungary and 
Poland. This means that in a worst-case scenario, an “EU member state with a will to commit 
atrocity crimes need only have a good friend in the UN Security Council to block the UN from 
acting and then block the EU (or NATO for that matter) in their own capacity” (Petersson, 2011: p. 
358). 
Even in terms of  the EU’s external policies, implementation of  R2P is patchy. While the EU and its 
member states rhetorically support R2P, actual implementation of  the norm in EU institutional 
processes and foreign policies has been problematic (de Franco, Meyer, and Smith, 2015). In 2013, 
the European Parliament (2013) called for member states and EU institutions to agree a European 
Consensus on R2P. In 2015, the EU appointed an R2P contact point, a Deputy Secretary-General 
of  the EEAS.1 The 2016 Global Strategy signalled that building the ‘resilience’ of  societies would 
help prevent conflicts and crises. In 2017, an EU statement revealed that an atrocity prevention 
1 Information about the EU’s R2P contact point is unavailable on the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
website. Only by reading the press releases regarding the annual meetings of  the Global Network of  R2P Contact 
Points is it possible to confirm that there is indeed an R2P contact point in the EEAS. See http://www.globalr2p.org/
our_work/global_network_of_r2p_focal_points 
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toolkit was being developed and that the risk of  atrocity crimes was included in conflict early 
warning systems (European Union, 2017a). The EU and its member states have also supported the 
creation and operation of  the International Criminal Court (ICC), which can try individuals for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (European Union, 2016a, p. 42). However, there 
is still no clear high-level declaration regarding the EU’s commitment to mass atrocity prevention or 
R2P.
Furthermore, the EU is divided principally over the third strand of  R2P, with many member states 
unable or unwilling to contemplate the use of  force to protect populations from atrocities, as seen 
in the intra-EU divisions over Libya in 2011 (Brockmeier et al., 2014). Any EU use of  force 
requires UN authorisation, but even a UN request for EU military assistance is insufficient: for 
example, in 2008 EU member states could not agree to send a battlegroup to the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo, even though the UN Secretary-General requested the deployment. There is 
also no consensus over the use of  other measures to protect populations, including imposing 
sanctions or accepting refugees. Mass atrocity prevention and response can entail uncomfortable 
choices, such as confronting governments suspected of  committing mass atrocities. Even the 
prevention aspects of  R2P are not accepted uncritically, with some EU and member state officials 
arguing that because the EU has a conflict prevention policy, 
there is no need to develop separate mass atrocity prevention 
tools, despite the fact that mass atrocity prevention and 
conflict prevention do not overlap neatly.2 This working paper 
aims to discover more about the current state of  the EU’s 
implementation of  the R2P norm with respect to actual mass 
atrocity situations.
3. Analysing the EU’s Response to Mass Atrocities: a framework
To analyse the EU’s response to mass atrocities, this paper will take a three-step approach. It will 
first establish whether or not the EU has identified that atrocity crimes are being committed, or that 
there is a serious risk that they will be committed, and whether or not discussions are taking place 
within the EU framework on how to respond. Naming the crimes is controversial, as not only can 
the government of  the country concerned take offence but so can other countries, some of  whom 
could block action (especially if  they are permanent members of  the UN Security Council). But at 
least one study has found that ‘naming and shaming’ perpetrators of  mass atrocities can reduce the 
severity of  ongoing atrocities (Krain, 2012). 
The second step is a consideration of  the actions that the EU has taken (if  any) in response to 
warnings of  ongoing or imminent mass atrocities. Because the EU’s own early warning reports are 
confidential, this paper considers the public warnings issued principally by the UN. In the lexicon 
2 An illustration: a typical conflict prevention policy would encourage the parties to a conflict to negotiate a peace 
agreement; a mass atrocity prevention policy would recognise that if  a party to a conflict has engaged in mass 
atrocities, then treating it as a legitimate partner in a peace process is counterproductive at best. See Bellamy, 2011.
Implementation of  R2P in EU 
institutional processes and foreign 
policies has been problematic.
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of  mass atrocity prevention, this is the time for ‘direct prevention’ measures (as opposed to 
‘structural prevention’ measures, which aim to address the ‘root causes’ of  mass atrocities) and 
response. Direct prevention and response measures aim to halt or reverse the violence. A variety of  
policy instruments could be used (see Table 1), though evidence for the effectiveness of  all these 
tools can be scarce or sometimes contradictory (Rudolf, 2016). 
Table 1: Direct prevention of  and response to mass atrocities: a continuum of  policy tools
Political/Diplomatic Economic/Social Legal Military
Positive/
incentives
Friends groups Economic 
inducements 
including trade and 
aid incentives
Incentives 
including military 
aid
Provide financial and 
technical support for 
indigenous early-warning/
response systems and 
conflict resolution by 
NGOs, local communities 
and/or business
Political incentives: 
diplomatic recognition; 
structured dialogue; 
membership in international 
organisations
More 
intrusive 
measures
Diplomatic peace-making, 
including: ambassadors on 
the ground, use of  eminent 
persons/envoys; good 
offices/mediation; 
arbitration; peace 
commissions
Preventive 
deployment
Fact-finding missions and 
the systematic collection of  
data by embassies on the 
ground 
Prevention of  
incitement (e.g. 
jamming radios)
Human rights investigations Safe havens and 
no-fly zones
Negative/
Coercive 
Condemnation Asset seizures Threat of  
or referral 
to ICC
Withdrawal of  
military assistance
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Naming/shaming Trade sanctions 
(including banning 
of  trade in 
particular products)
Domestic 
indictments
Arms embargoes
Travel bans Heightened 
presence
Diplomatic sanctions 
(recalling/expelling 
diplomats; withdrawal of  
diplomatic mission)
Aid reduction or 
suspension
Jamming/
information 
operations
Suspension from 
international/regional 
organisation
Divestment Sabotage/
leadership 
targeting
Cultural/sporting boycotts No-fly zones and 
safe havens
Intervention
Source: Task Force on EU Prevention of  Mass Atrocities (2013), p. 53 and p. 72.
It must be noted that the use of  these tools is usually envisaged vis-à-vis a government more or less 
capable of  responding to the incentives and disincentives. Yet in many mass atrocity situations, 
there may be no single authority responsible for atrocities, the government may be dismissive of  
outside influence, and/or the government may be protected from such influence by other 
international actors. Of  the cases considered here, Central African Republic is of  the first type, 
South Sudan fits the first and third types, while Myanmar seems to fit the second and third types. 
The third step in the analysis is to try to explain why the EU has responded in the way that it has. 
Were there any divisions among EU member states and EU institutions regarding the response? 
Which actors were pushing for EU action? Were there actors that resisted particular EU responses? 
4. Central African Republic
4.1 Warnings of  atrocities
The Central African Republic (CAR) has experienced considerable instability since its independence 
in 1960, but in 2013 identity-based violence in the country escalated sharply. In March 2013, the 
Séléka rebel group overthrew the government. In response, the anti-Balaka militia group formed in 
August–September 2013. Both groups committed atrocities, the Séléka mainly against Christians, 
the anti-Balaka mainly against Muslims. On 5 and 6 December 2013, around 1,000 people were 
killed in fighting (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p. 5). 
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Throughout 2013, a number of  warnings about the severity of  the violence were issued by France, 
UN actors, and NGOs (see Cinq-Mars, 2015; pp. 9–11). In January 2013, the French permanent 
representative to the UN Security Council argued that the crisis in CAR was taking on a religious 
and ethnic dimension (Cinq-Mars, 2015; p. 11). A report by the UN Secretary-General to the 
Security Council in May noted that violence was occurring along religious lines (United Nations 
Security Council, 2013). In June 2013, the International Crisis Group tracked the growth of  
anti-Muslim feeling in Bangui, while Human Rights Watch reported destruction of  churches 
(Cinq-Mars, 2015; p. 11). That same month, the UN Office of  the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights dispatched a fact-finding mission to CAR, which reported back in September and found that 
gross human rights violations and war crimes had been committed (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2013). 
On 1 October 2013, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of  Genocide, Adama Dieng, and 
the UN Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Jennifer Welsh, expressed their deep 
concern over the deteriorating situation in the CAR, and urged CAR authorities to protect the 
population against the risk of  atrocity crimes, including sexual 
violence against women and children (United Nations Press 
Release, 2013b). A month later, Dieng told reporters: “My 
feeling is that this will end with Christian communities, 
Muslim communities killing each other which means that if  
we don’t act now and decisively I will not exclude the 
possibility of  a genocide occurring” (Nichols, 2013). 
On 22 November 2013, the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, warned that the CAR was 
“on the verge of  genocide” (France 24, 2013). On 5 December 2013, the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect (2013) issued a statement that “a failure to confront the rapidly 
deteriorating situation could result in large-scale mass atrocity crimes and further mass 
displacement”. And on 22 January 2014, Dieng told the Security Council that the nature of  attacks 
by ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka militia on the basis of  religion or ethnicity “constitute crimes against 
humanity” and that “[i]f  not halted, there is a risk of  genocide” (United Nations Meetings 
Coverage, 2014).
At the start of  2013, a small peacekeeping force of  the Economic Community of  Central African 
States (ECCAS), MICOPAX, was on the ground. In August 2013, the African Union (AU) and 
ECCAS agreed to replace MICOPAX with an AU-led force (MISCA) of  3,500 military personnel 
by the end of  2013. France also has had troops on the ground since 2002, and had deployed to 
protect the Bangui airport in March 2013. On 5 December, the UN Security Council imposed an 
arms embargo on the CAR, and authorised MISCA and French forces (Operation Sangaris) to 
“take all necessary measures” (including the use of  force) to protect civilians and restore security 
(UN Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013)). The Security Council also established an 
International Commission of  Inquiry to investigate human rights violations since the start of  2013. 
That inquiry estimated that from December 2013 until November 2014, a total of  3,000–6,000 
In many mass atrocity situations, 
there may be no single authority 
responsible for atrocities.
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people were killed, 80 percent of  CAR’s Muslim population had been displaced or killed, and the 
capital city Bangui’s Muslim population had declined by 99 percent. This amounted to a crime 
against humanity (United Nations, 2014; paragraphs 447 and 453). In January 2014, the UN 
Security Council extended the arms embargo and froze the assets and imposed travel bans on 
individuals undermining peace and security in the CAR (UN Security Council Resolution 2134 
(2014)). 
4.2. The EU response to atrocities in the Central African Republic
Evan Cinq-Mars (2015) criticised the international response to the CAR in 2013/2014 as “too little, 
too late” to prevent atrocities: despite a year of  warning signs and actual warnings, only after 
violence seriously erupted in early December 2013 did the UN and other relevant actors respond 
decisively. Charles Brown (2016) makes the same critique of  the US response, noting that even the 
Obama Administration’s declared commitment to atrocity prevention, and the presence of  several 
atrocity prevention advocates within the Administration (such as the US Ambassador to the UN, 
Samantha Power) did not translate into the early action that might have helped to prevent atrocities 
in the CAR.
The EU is not exempt from this criticism. It engaged in direct prevention rather than structural 
prevention: most EU action was taken only from December 2013, almost a year after warnings 
about the ethnic and religious nature of  the violence. The EU’s response consisted primarily of  
four prongs: supporting international measures (peacekeeping force, investigations of  human rights 
violations, diplomacy); increasing its humanitarian aid; imposing sanctions in line with UN Security 
Council resolutions; and deploying a military mission, one of  whose tasks was to protect the 
population. The latter decision, however, was delayed by several months as EU member states 
declined to provide forces for the mission. As Tim Haesebrouck and Melanie Van Meirvenne 
(2015; p. 279) argue: “If  the Member States had designated the prevention of  mass atrocities an 
explicit strategic objective of  the CSDP [Common Security and Defence Policy], the possibility of  
an intervention in the CAR could have been on the agenda long before November 2013.”
Table 2: EU measures vis-à-vis Central African Republic: a summary
Positive measures Intrusive measures Negative measures
Development aid continues, 
though some aid is redirected 
and projects are put on hold; 
Bêkou Trust Fund created
Verbal support for diplomatic 
initiatives to end the conflict
Condemnation
Humanitarian aid Verbal support for UN 
Secretary-General’s Commission 
of  Enquiry and Office of  the 
High Commissioner for Human 
Rights investigation
Implement UN arms embargo
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Support for AU resolution on an 
independent expert for the CAR, 
Human Rights Council
Implement UN targeted 
sanctions 
Financial support for ECCAS 
and AU peacekeeping missions 
(African Peace Facility)
Support for ICC referral
Financial support for AU 
mediation efforts (African Peace 
Facility)
CSDP military mission EUFOR 
RCA
The EU is an important donor and trading partner of  the Central African Republic. The CAR is a 
member of  the Cotonou Agreement (signed in 2000), a wide-ranging economic and political 
partnership agreement between 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries and the EU. The 
agreement includes a so-called ‘human rights clause’ (Article 96), which means that aid and trade 
benefits, or even the agreement as a whole, can be suspended or revoked if  a partner to the 
agreement violates fundamental human rights and democratic principles. Between November 2003 
and June 2005, the EU partially suspended cooperation with the CAR following a coup d’état; 
cooperation was resumed after elections were held. The EU institutions have been the largest 
development aid donor to the CAR (OECD, 2018).
As the former colonial power, France has been the most important European actor in the CAR, 
and to a great extent France has been the driving force behind EU policy towards the country. Yet 
other EU member states shaped—and blocked—French initiatives vis-à-vis the CAR. 
From late 2012 to autumn 2013, the crisis in the CAR attracted some attention from the European 
Commission. On 21 December 2012, the Commissioner for International Cooperation, 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, Kristalina Georgieva, expressed concern about renewed 
violence in the country and called on all armed groups to respect international humanitarian law 
(European Commission, 2012). In July 2013, she visited the CAR, and announced that the EU 
would give a further €8 million in humanitarian aid (European Commission, 2013). 
Following the March 2013 coup d’état, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, condemned the violent and unconstitutional change of  
government and called for “all armed groups to respect and protect the civilian population as well 
as to respect international humanitarian law and the activities of  humanitarian organisations” 
(European Union, 2013). The situation in the CAR was discussed in several meetings of  the Africa 
Working Group (official level) and the Political and Security Committee (ambassadorial level) in 
2013. 
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The first high-level discussion of  the violence in the CAR took place in the autumn of  2013. On 21 
October, the Council of  the European Union (2013a) expressed concern at the human rights 
violations in the CAR, supported mediation efforts by the African Union and ECCAS, and signalled 
financial support for MISCA via the African Peace Facility. Although the UN special advisers had 
warned of  the risk of  genocide, the EU’s initial declarations do not go so far: this declaration 
mentions human rights violations, but does not use stronger language referring to atrocities. 
Almost two months later, on 16 December, the Council (Council of  the European Union, 2013b) 
went much further; by this time the UN Security Council was beginning to act (partly as a result of  
French diplomacy). The Council’s conclusions express the EU’s concerns about serious violations 
of  human rights and international humanitarian law, mention that the CAR is a party to the 
International Criminal Court statute (an implicit threat that the situation should be referred to the 
ICC), announce an increase in EU humanitarian aid to the 
CAR and in funding to MISCA, promise an increase in 
development aid, and hold out the possibility of  a military 
mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). A day later, the EU implemented the UN Security 
Council arms embargo on the CAR. In March 2014, the EU 
implemented UN Security Council targeted sanctions (asset 
freezes; travel bans) on individuals held responsible for 
undermining security in the CAR (O’Kane, 2014).
On 20 January 2014, at a Human Rights Council Special Session on the CAR, the European Union 
(2014) condemned the human rights violations, and called for those committing “acts that could 
constitute crimes under the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court” to be held 
accountable. This is as far as the EU goes in terms of  language acknowledging atrocity crimes in 
the CAR in 2013–14. It is also as far as the EU went in terms of  supporting the involvement of  the 
ICC: the EU did not call outright for an ICC investigation. (The ICC has opened an investigation 
into events in the CAR since 2012, but did so after a request of  the transitional government of  the 
CAR in May 2014.)
Between 2013 and 2016, the EU gave over €500 million to the CAR (European Commission, 2016). 
It became the largest donor of  humanitarian aid to the country. It also created a ‘trust fund’ (named 
Bêkou), using a new legal tool: trust funds can be established rapidly, multiple donors from within 
the EU and outside it can contribute to it, and the aid can be coordinated more efficiently and 
quickly. The Bêkou Trust Fund, which France pushed for, was set up in July 2014, initially by the 
European Commission, France, Germany and the Netherlands (Barbière, 2014b); Italy and 
Switzerland later contributed to it. It totalled €146 million, and aimed primarily to help the CAR 
exit from the crisis and reconstruct. According to the European Court of  Auditors (2017), the fund 
has had a positive impact, but still did not coordinate donors as effectively as it should have and 
attracted funding from only a small group of  countries (although some member states contributed 
to UN trust funds for the country instead).
The most striking element of  the 
EU’s response to the violence in 
the CAR was its deployment of  a 
military mission.
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The most striking element of  the EU’s response to the violence in the CAR was its deployment of  
a military mission. France pushed hard for this option, as its own military operation and MISCA 
alone were insufficient given the deteriorating security situation. In January 2014, the Council 
agreed to send a military mission to protect populations; it would be short-term (six months) and 
hand over to a UN peacekeeping mission. The UK ruled out using a battlegroup (a standing 
rapid-response force, whose composition is supposed to shift every six months) (Gardner, 2014a). 
In February 2014, EUFOR RCA was established, but it was not until 1 April 2014 that the mission 
was actually launched. Six ‘force generation conferences’ were required before the mission’s planned 
strength of  750 troops was reached, and even then France provided most of  the troops. A non-EU 
country, Georgia, provided the second largest contingent (Tardy, 2015). On 18 March, the French 
Foreign and Defence Ministers stated that “the EU committed itself  on 10 February to deploy a 
military operation in order to support international efforts and stabilise the situation in the Central 
African Republic. To this day, despite the contribution of  some member states, one cannot but 
notice that Europe has not done enough” (Barbière, 2014a).
Niklas Novaky (2016, p. 96) argued that, “Due to the terrible humanitarian situation in the CAR, 
EU Member States felt obliged to consider the deployment of  CSDP mission to improve the 
country’s security climate . . . Since most Member States had only limited interests at stake in the 
CAR, they were unwilling to make significant contributions to 
either operation.” EU member states appeared to know that 
‘something should be done’ to protect populations from 
atrocities, but they were not willing to follow through with 
this. Granted, there were other contemporaneous crises 
(Ukraine above all), but the lack of  member state ‘buy-in’ to 
EUFOR RCA is still noticeable.
The mission mandate for EUFOR RCA included the protection of  civilians, which is striking: most 
EU mission mandates do not. The mission duration was extended to 15 March 2015, and EUFOR 
RCA was then replaced with a one-year small (70-strong) military advice mission (EUMAM RCA), 
which in turn was replaced by a security forces training mission (EUTM CAR) for two years from 
March 2016. 
Although humanitarian motives were behind both the French and the EU decisions to send troops 
to the CAR, Catherine Gegout cautions against assuming humanitarianism was the most important 
driving factor. French President François Holland did declare that Operation Sangaris was a 
humanitarian mission, but this was linked “to the prestige of  France as a state that defends human 
rights” (Gegout, 2017; p. 206). Gegout points out that France also did not respond quickly to the 
violence in the CAR, that its intervention was limited to the capital Bangui and surroundings, and 
that French forces “were careful not to take excessive risks for themselves in saving the population” 
(Gegout, 2017; p. 206). The EU’s response showed reluctant support for the French troops and an 
To a great extent France has been 
the driving force behind EU policy 
towards the country.
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attempt “to demonstrate that the European Union was concerned with a humanitarian crisis” 
(Gegout, 2017; p. 280). But only France among the large EU member states contributed troops, and 
the mission was very limited in scope. 
In sum, the EU’s response to the CAR was in many ways extensive, employing a number of  policy 
instruments, which fall mainly under the ‘positive’ and ‘intrusive’ category of  direct prevention 
efforts. Yet the EU reacted slowly to warnings and the driving force behind EU policy was just one 
member state: France. Humanitarian motives were certainly present, but were not widely enough 
shared by the member states, given that only a small minority of  member states provided troops for 
EUFOR RCA and contributed to the Bêkou Trust Fund. 
Compared to the EU’s response to the two other cases considered in this paper, however, the 
response to the CAR was more comprehensive and decisive. Yet this does not mean that the 
EU—or any other international actor—has actually been successful in ending mass atrocities in the 
CAR. In fact, since December 2017 clashes between groups have resulted in rising numbers of  
deaths and displaced persons and serious human rights violations.
5. Myanmar
5.1 Warnings of  atrocities
At the start of  2017, Myanmar seemed to be one of  the few good news stories: the military junta 
had been ceding power since 2011, and in 2015, national elections were won overwhelmingly by the 
opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Suu Kyi, winner of  the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, is barred 
from holding office but exercises influence from outside government. After several decades of  
authoritarian, military rule, Myanmar appeared to be in transition to democracy. A ceasefire 
agreement between the government and a number of  ethnic groups was agreed in 2015, which 
seemed to promise an end to cycles of  violence and atrocity.
However, the human rights situation in Rakhine State still generated concern amongst external 
observers. In Rakhine, the Rohingya minority, predominantly Muslim, were not considered to be 
Myanmar citizens and so were stateless, and there was frequent inter-communal violence. Before 
August 2017, there were already over 200,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs, 2018). The situation was described as a 
“slow-motion genocide” by two academics who also argued that both the Myanmar government 
and the local community have committed acts of  genocide against the Rohingya for 35 years (Zarni 
and Cowley, 2014).
Between 2013 and August 2017, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of  Genocide, Adama 
Dieng, repeatedly expressed concern at human rights violations against the Rohingya (United 
Nations Press Release 2013a, 2015, 2016c, 2017b). In February 2017, the United Nations Office of  
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the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2017) issued a report detailing violations of  human 
rights against the Rohinyga by security forces. At the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights 
Council (HRC), the human rights situation in Rakhine had been the subject of  numerous 
resolutions and statements, including two specifically on the Rohingya at the HRC in June 2015 
(Resolution 29/21) and June 2013 (Presidential Statement PRST/23/1). In March 2017, the UN 
Human Rights Council (Resolution 34/22) set up a fact-finding commission to investigate human 
rights violations in Rakhine, though it was denied entry by the Myanmar government (the 
Resolution was sponsored by the EU). For several years from 2012, the Secretary-General’s Special 
Adviser on Myanmar had briefed the UN Security Council with updates on the situation in Rakhine 
(Security Council Report, 2018).
Thus before serious violence erupted in August 2017, there had been numerous, repeated warnings 
about continued human rights violations against the Rohingya. Yet the good news story of  an 
apparent transition to democracy in Myanmar tempered the 
criticism, leading to a narrative about incentivising reform 
rather than threatening negative measures over the treatment 
of  the Rohingya. For Jürgen Haacke (2016; p. 819), “the case 
of  Myanmar demonstrates that the implementation of  R2P 
has been subsumed to broader political considerations”, in 
particular the view that the government “would be a necessary 
partner to bring about a successful political transition in 
Myanmar”.
In August 2017, an armed Rohingya group attacked police posts. In response, the Myanmar armed 
forces launched a disproportionate response, which the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Zeid Ra‘ad al-Hussein, labelled “a textbook case of  ethnic cleansing” (UN News, 2017). 
Since August 2017, almost 700,000 Rohingyas have fled Myanmar, and are mostly encamped across 
the border in Bangladesh. On 19 October, Dieng and the UN Special Adviser for the Responsibility 
to Protect, Ivan Šimonivić, called on the Myanmar government to “take immediate action to stop 
and address the commission of  atrocity crimes that are reportedly taking place in northern Rakhine 
state” (United Nations Press Release, 2017c). 
The UN Security Council has not issued a resolution on the situation. The UK is the ‘pen holder’ 
on Myanmar at the UN Security Council, and has kept the item as a continuing matter of  concern, 
but has not been able to push through a resolution. On 6 November, a presidential statement (S/
PRST/2017/22) indicated that the Security Council condemned the attacks on the Rohingyas, and 
reminded the Myanmar government of  its responsibility to protect its population. But presidential 
statements do not have the same force in international law as Security Council resolutions do, and 
this one did not impose any measures on the Myanmar government or set any deadlines for action 
by it. A report by the UK House of  Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2017, p. 18) expressed 
In an echo of  the criticisms of  the 
response to the crisis in the CAR, 
the Burma Campaign UK called the 
measures “too little, too late”.
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dismay at the “meagre results” of  the UK’s diplomacy at the UN on Myanmar. The USA and 
Canada are among states that have imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on Myanmar, 
but China and Russia are the largest arms suppliers to the Myanmar government (Deen, 2017).
In March 2018, Dieng lambasted the international response: 
Despite the numerous warnings I have made of  the risk of  atrocity crimes, the international 
community has buried its head in the sand . . . All the information I have received indicates 
that the intent of  the perpetrators was to cleanse northern Rakhine state of  their existence, 
possibly even to destroy the Rohingya as such, which, if  proven, would constitute the crime 
of  genocide (United Nations Press Release, 2018).
5.2 The EU’s response to human rights violations in Rakhine State, Myanmar
As the military junta took steps to relinquish power in 2011, the EU moved quickly to encourage 
political liberalisation. In May 2012, it suspended all of  the sanctions it had previously imposed on 
Myanmar, with the exception of  an arms embargo. Those sanctions included targeted sanctions 
(asset freezes and travel bans) against individuals impeding progress towards democracy, and 
restrictions on investment in logging and timber sectors, and the mining of  precious stones and 
minerals. In April 2013, the EU fully lifted the sanctions (except for the arms embargo) and 
restored trade preferences, which had been suspended in 1997 over the use of  forced labour in the 
country (Bünte and Portela, 2012). Since 1995 the EU has sponsored a yearly resolution on the 
human rights situation in Myanmar at the UN Commission on Human Rights and its successor 
body, the Human Rights Council; since 2002, it had done so at the General Assembly. In 2016, it 
decided not to introduce a resolution on human rights in Myanmar at the General Assembly, a 
signal of  encouragement to the reform process.
In June 2016, the European Commission and EU High Representative (2016) published ‘Elements 
for an EU strategy vis-à-vis Myanmar/Burma’. While most of  the document makes proposals for 
EU support for reform, one section does acknowledge the particular human rights challenges in 
Rakhine State. There, the EU should “work with the government to combat hate speech and 
intolerance”, advocate “the elimination of  statelessness” and work to “further general human rights 
awareness” (European Commission and EU High Representative, 2016; p. 8). In retrospect, these 
proposals seem to vastly underestimate the government’s unwillingness to respect the human rights 
of  the Rohingya. 
Many observers have denounced the EU for not using the term ‘Rohingya’ in its pronouncements, 
in line with the policy of  the Myanmar government to call them ‘Bengalis’ rather than acknowledge 
them as an ethnic minority within Myanmar (Khin, 2017). But although EU High Representative 
Federica Mogherini’s early statements did not use the term, later ones did, as do the conclusions of  
the Council of  the EU. 
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In the initial weeks after violence exploded in August 2017, the EU responded primarily with a 
humanitarian aid operation (a total of  €51 million was given in 2017). The first announcement of  
aid did not do much more than hint gently at the political context behind the refugee exodus from 
Rakhine (European Commission, 2017). Later in November, however, the European Commissioner 
for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, Christos Stylianides, told reporters that he agreed 
that ethnic cleansing best described what was happening (Pinna, 2017).
Mogherini’s first statement on the situation, on 6 September, condemned the attacks on Myanmar 
security forces, not the over-reaction by those security responses (European External Action 
Service, 2017a). In a speech to an urgent session of  the European Parliament on 14 September, her 
message became more focused on the Myanmar military forces: “We are very much aware and 
concerned about the excesses during the security operations conducted by Myanmar’s security 
forces. This has led to a massive flow of  refugees into Bangladesh—one of  the most terrible 
refugee crises of  our time” (European External Action Service, 2017b).
Besides offering humanitarian aid to refugees, the EU also pushed for a Bangladesh–Myanmar 
agreement on the return of  refugees (which seemed premature when refugees were still arriving in 
Bangladesh and does not address the root causes of  the refugee exodus), and on a “positive 
approach” (Deutsche Welle, 2017). On a visit to the region in November, Mogherini told the press 
that:
It is a matter of  encouraging the leadership and the government, and starting from Aung San 
Suu Kyi, to implement what they have expressed as intentions . . . She needs our support to 
do that, consistently and we can support in implementing that plan, if  the political will 
translates into real action. So more than putting pressure, I would say that our approach has 
always been, and will continue to be, to offer a negotiating space, encourage the taking care of  
the situation that is not going to disappear (European External Action Service, 2017c). 
Gradually, the EU’s message hardened, but only in the spring of  2018 did the EU take negative 
measures of  any substance. On 16 October 2017, the Council of  the EU addressed the situation in 
Myanmar, noting that there were reports of  “serious human violations”. It called for an “end to all 
violence”, and for the Myanmar military to cease its operations and observe human rights law. It 
urged the government to cooperate with the UN Human Rights Council’s fact-finding mission. The 
EU also declared that it was suspending invitations to high-ranking military officers and reviewing 
defence cooperation. It signalled that it “may consider additional measures if  the situation does not 
improve” but could also respond positively if  it does improve (Council of  the European Union, 
2017).
‘Human rights violations’ was the preferred term used by the EU in most of  its statements, though 
at a special session of  the UN Human Rights Council on 5 December 2017 the EU did refer 
indirectly to the perpetration of  atrocities: “We also call on the Government of  Myanmar/Burma 
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to ensure the swift establishment of  the non-discriminatory rule of  law and full accountability for 
those responsible for committing atrocities” (European Union, 2017b). Some European politicians 
went further. French President Emmanuel Macron told the UN General Assembly on 20 
September that the Rohingyas were victims of  ethnic cleansing and genocide (Le Monde, 2017). 
On 20 February 2018, UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson told the House of  Commons that 
“This has been ethnic cleansing on an industrial scale and it may also have been genocide” (House 
of  Commons, Hansard, 20 February 2018; vol. 636, col. 20). German politicians, in contrast, were 
much less forthright, focusing on providing aid to the refugees rather than condemning the crimes 
that were being committed (see, for example, Federal Foreign Office, 2017). 
The Council of  the EU issued more conclusions on Myanmar on 26 February 2018, and deplored 
the fact that, since its previous statement in October, there were continuing human rights violations 
and that Myanmar had refused to cooperate with the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar. It called 
on Myanmar to become a party to the ICC Statute, or to allow the ICC to exercise jurisdiction. It 
then announced that the arms embargo would be strengthened, instructed the High Representative 
to make proposals for targeted sanctions against senior 
military officers responsible for human rights violations, and 
noted that trade preferences depend on respect for human 
rights (Council of  the European Union, 2018). Targeted 
sanctions were eventually agreed in late April 2018, which 
expand the arms embargo, prohibit cooperation with the 
Myanmar military, and impose travel bans and asset freezes on 
individuals from the security forces held responsible for 
human rights violations. In an echo of  the criticisms of  the 
response to the crisis in the CAR, the Burma Campaign UK 
called the measures “too little, too late”, and indicated that they “are not an adequate or 
proportionate response given the scale and seriousness of  violations of  international law taking 
place” (Burma Campaign UK, 2018).
In the CAR case, France took a leading role in pushing for EU action; in the Myanmar case, no 
single member state took such a strong position. The UK was more focused on a positive approach 
to fostering political reform in the country; Germany was focused on assisting the refugees. The 
UK’s stance was criticised by the House of  Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, for not 
“delivering tough and unwelcome messages to the Burmese Government about the Rohingya” (UK 
House of  Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017). Matthew Rycroft (2018), the UK 
Permanent Secretary at the Department for International Development, argued that keeping China 
‘on board’ in the Security Council was an imperative for the UK: “If  we do want to be serious 
about doing anything in Myanmar, chances are the Chinese are going to be involved, and so, we 
took a decision, the UK, that it was better to go at the pace that China allowed.” As China is a 
major backer of  the Myanmar government, this approach has sidelined the UN Security Council.
The good news story of  an apparent 
transition to democracy in Myanmar 
tempered the criticism of  violence 
against the Rohingya.
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In sum, the EU’s response to the Rohingya crisis consisted of  some positive measures and a few 
negative measures, though the latter were introduced only gradually, after moves to influence the 
Myanmar government appeared not to be having much of  an impact. Similarly to the CAR case, the 
EU took more decisive measures only months after the violence escalated, and well after warnings 
had been given about the risk of  human rights violations and atrocities against the Rohingyas. With 
the UN Security Council unable or unwilling to act, the EU’s influence in any case will be very 
limited, but the EU has in turn not pressed hard for UN Security Council action, such as a referral 
of  the situation to the ICC. The EU’s response to the apparent ethnic cleansing of  the Rohingya is 
a test case of  principled pragmatism, in which an assessment of  the strategic environment resulted 
in a weak response to mass atrocities.
Table 3: EU measures vis-à-vis Myanmar: a summary
Positive measures Intrusive measures Negative measures
Humanitarian aid for refugees Verbal support for UN human 
rights investigations 
Condemnation 
Development aid continues Continuation of  EU arms 
embargo
Suspension of  meetings with 
military officers (October 
2017)
EU targeted measures 
threatened (February 2018) 
and imposed (May 2018)
6. South Sudan
6.1 Warnings of  atrocities
South Sudan is the UN’s newest member state, having achieved independence from Sudan in July 
2011, several years after a peace agreement had laid out a process for separation from Sudan. After 
independence, rival political and ethnic groups repeatedly clashed, and in 2013, civil war broke out, 
between supporters of  rival politicians. Much of  the fighting has been along communal lines. It is 
estimated that up to 300,000 people have been killed (Casey, 2017). Parts of  South Sudan have 
experienced famine, and aid workers and UN peacekeepers have also been killed.
A UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), has been 
present in the country since 2011, but has struggled to protect civilians; its strength has been 
increased to almost 18,000 personnel, making it one of  the largest UN peacekeeping missions in 
2018 (the largest is in the Democratic Republic of  Congo). In March 2015, the UN Security 
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Council imposed targeted sanctions (asset freezes; travel bans) on individuals held responsible for 
threatening peace and security in South Sudan (UN Security Council Resolution 2206). The six 
individuals targeted came from both sides of  the conflict. 
In August 2015, both sides signed a peace agreement, largely mediated by the regional organisation 
the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with support from other 
international actors, including the UK and the EU. The agreement envisaged a hybrid court to 
investigate atrocities. Less than a year later, however, fighting resumed. The hybrid court has not 
been set up. Although South Sudan is not a party to the ICC, the Security Council could refer the 
situation to the ICC, but has not. In December 2016, the Security Council failed to agree on further 
targeted sanctions and an arms embargo, because only seven Security Council members voted in 
favour of  it (nine are required) while eight abstained. South Sudan’s government had argued that 
the situation was improving; China, Russia, and the other abstaining states agreed that the UN 
should support the government rather than take counter-productive steps (United Nations, 2016).
The nature of  the violence in South Sudan prompted several 
warnings about the risk of  mass atrocities. In December 2013, 
UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of  Genocide, Adama 
Dieng, and the UN Special Adviser on the Responsibility to 
Protect, Jennifer Welsh, issued a statement expressing concern 
about the ethnic-based violence and warned that attacks on 
civilians and UNMISS personnel could constitute war crimes 
and crimes against humanity (United Nations Press Release, 2013c).
In July 2016, after fighting resumed in South Sudan, Dieng again expressed concern about threats 
to the population, and called for those responsible for human rights violations to be brought to 
justice (United Nations Press Release, 2016a). He visited South Sudan in November, and told the 
Security Council that there was a potential for genocide in the country. There had been targeted 
killings and rape of  members of  particular ethnic groups (United Nations Press Release, 2016b). 
He recommended that the UN impose an arms embargo and sanctions, and boost UNMISS. In 
February 2017, Dieng again warned that there was an ever-present risk that mass atrocities would 
be committed (United Nations Press Release, 2017a).
In February 2018, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (set up by the Human 
Rights Council two years earlier) reported that over 40 South Sudanese officials should be held 
accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity (United Nations Human Rights Council, 
2018). In February 2018, the US imposed an arms embargo on the country. In March 2018, the UN 
Security Council renewed the UNMISS mission again and indicated that it would consider imposing 
an arms embargo on South Sudan (UN Security Council Resolution 2406).
The EU’s declarations mostly  
contain exhortations for others to 
take action.
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In sum, there have been repeated warnings of  mass atrocities in South Sudan, as well as evidence 
gathered demonstrating that atrocities have occurred—despite the presence of  a large UN 
peacekeeping mission in the country. Only limited sanctions have been imposed by the UN Security 
Council, and a UN arms embargo was only narrowly agreed on 13 July 2018.
6.2 The EU’s response to atrocities in South Sudan
Soon after South Sudan became independent, the EU agreed that it would follow a ‘comprehensive 
approach’ towards the country, to cover all aspects of  EU policy from development to security. An 
EU Special Representative to Sudan and South Sudan served until 2013. The Council of  the EU 
agreed in June 2012 to deploy a very limited civilian CSDP mission, EUVASEC, which would help 
improve aviation security at Juba international airport, at South Sudan’s request. EUVASEC 
consisted of  just over 60 personnel, and lasted from September 2012 to January 2014. However, the 
mission was evacuated in December 2013, at the outbreak of  the civil war. Member states failed to 
renew the mission: although several member states wanted it to continue, the UK opposed its 
prolongation (Gardner, 2014b). 
The mandate of  the EU Special Representative (EUSR) to Sudan and South Sudan was terminated 
on 31 August 2013—just before the civil war broke out. The reasons lie in bureaucratic politics in 
Brussels: the EU High Commissioner, Catherine Ashton, wanted to rationalise all of  the EUSRs 
and locate them within the new European External Action Service (EEAS), thus bringing them 
under EEAS control and out from under the control of  the Council of  the EU. In early 2013 she 
informed the member states of  her intention to terminate the mandate of  three EUSRs, including 
that for Sudan and South Sudan. Instead, the EUSR for the Horn of  Africa would have a larger 
mandate. But as Erwan Fouéré (2013) noted, there was always a risk that such a move would signal 
lowered foreign policy ambitions and interest in the regions with a terminated EUSR.
The EU has imposed an arms embargo on South Sudan since 2011 (well before the US did so, in 
2018). In July 2014, almost a year before the UN Security Council did so, the EU placed targeted 
sanctions (asset freezes; travel bans) on individuals held responsible for violence and breaking the 
peace agreements; the list of  individuals has periodically been amended and extended since then 
(most recently in February 2018). The EU has also encouraged South Sudan to sign the Cotonou 
Agreement, but to date the government has not done so. Large sums of  humanitarian aid have also 
been given: €110 million in 2014, €127 million in 2015, and €163 million in 2016.3
The Council of  the EU has issued several conclusions on South Sudan, condemning the violence 
and the violations of  human rights and humanitarian law. In July 2014, a declaration on behalf  of  
the EU noted that “appalling human rights violations and crimes against humanity have taken 
place” (Council of  the European Union, 2014). On 12 December 2016, the Council cited Dieng’s 
warning “of  escalating violence along ethnic lines and the potential for genocide” (Council of  the 
3 Figures from the 2014, 2015, and 2016 annual reports on the EU’s humanitarian aid policies (available here: https://
ec.europa.eu/echo/who/accountability/annual-reports_en)
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European Union, 2016). At a special session of  the HRC on South Sudan a few days later, the EU’s 
statement referred to the risk of  genocide: “The EU is profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating 
human rights and humanitarian situation in South Sudan, today torn again by violent conflict and at 
risk of  complete fragmentation and of  genocide being committed” (European Union, 2016b). 
Several EU member states (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands) mentioned the risk of  
genocide and urged action to prevent it (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2016). 
The EU’s declarations, however, mostly contain exhortations for others to take action, principally 
the parties to the conflict. They contain little on what the EU will do: they express the EU’s support 
for various international efforts such as UNMISS, and they hold out the promise of  support should 
the country become more stable and less violent. Not one of  the Council of  the EU’s declarations 
on South Sudan even mentions the ICC. The EU’s rhetoric about the severity of  the situation in 
South Sudan is hardly commensurate with the sum total of  action that it has taken. It would appear 
that in this case, the apparent lack of  willingness of  the member states to engage more echoes 
international inertia, especially visible in the Security Council. 
Table 4: EU measures vis-à-vis South Sudan: a summary
Positive measures Intrusive measures Negative measures
Development aid continues Verbal support for hybrid 
court
Condemnation
Humanitarian aid Financial support for IGAD 
and AU mediation (African 
Peace Facility)
EU arms embargo
Involvement in peace process: 
member of  IGAD plus 
mediation process
Financial support for IGAD 
ceasefire monitoring 
mechanism (African Peace 
Facility)
Targeted sanctions (EU 
sanctions, and implementation 
of  UN sanctions)
Promise of  Cotonou 
Agreement
7. Conclusions
The EU has expressed support for the R2P norm and it has many tools for direct prevention of  
and response to mass atrocities. But as this paper has shown, the EU’s implementation of  the norm 
can demonstrate the shallowness of  member states’ willingness to act quickly and decisively in 
actual mass atrocity situations. This is partly because of  competing priorities, partly because of  
awareness of  obstacles in the external environment, and partly because the EU lacks institutional 
mechanisms that ensure mass atrocity prevention is a priority. Of  these three dynamics, however, it 
is the avoidance of  a firm and credible commitment to making mass atrocity a prevention that 
dominates; EU institutions and member states do not appear to be serious about preventing mass 
atrocities and upholding the R2P when doing so entails making difficult choices and committing 
resources accordingly. Priority-setting has always been challenging for the EU, given all of  the 
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competing priorities of  its constituent member states, as can be seen in the inconsistent pursuit of  
normative policies such as the promotion of  human rights. Consequently, the prospects for EU 
leadership on R2P are still hard to envisage. 
In response to mass atrocity situations in the Central African Republic, Myanmar, and South Sudan, 
the EU does acknowledge that mass atrocities are either occurring or that there is a serious risk of  
mass atrocities being perpetrated, but it does so long after credible ‘warners’ have issued warnings. 
The EU’s language can be cautious, often referring to serious violations of  human rights and 
humanitarian law, rather than ‘genocide’ or ‘crimes against humanity’. Although its condemnation 
of  the violations is clear and repeated in all three cases, by not regularly ‘naming and shaming’ 
perpetrators of  mass atrocities, the EU eschews a tool that has been found to be effective in 
reducing killings (Krain, 2012).
In all three cases, the EU has provided humanitarian aid, while development aid has never been 
suspended but may be redirected because of  the security and governance situation. In all three 
cases as well, the EU has indicated that it stands ready to provide further assistance once security 
and governance are restored. The EU has provided rhetorical 
and sometimes financial support for a variety of  intrusive 
measures, from UN and African regional organisations’ 
peacekeeping missions to UN human rights monitoring 
missions. But if  not much is happening at the UN or regional 
level, then the EU itself  does not implement intrusive 
measures. Resort to military intervention—possibly the most 
effective way to confront perpetrators of  mass atrocities and 
reduce killings, depending on the context (Rudolf, 2016; pp. 
92–3)—has generally been ruled out by the EU. The only 
exception to this is the CSDP military mission to the Central African Republic, but this came about 
principally because France and the UN pushed hard for it, and it proved very difficult to get many 
member states to actually contribute to it.
The EU’s response to the three situations shows that coercive measures are used, to some extent. In 
all three cases, it has imposed (or retained) an arms embargo—in contrast to the UN, which has 
been unable to reach agreement on an arms embargo in the cases of  Myanmar and South Sudan. In 
both Myanmar and South Sudan the EU has also imposed targeted sanctions before the UN 
Security Council decided to do so. 
There are also clear distinctions between the EU’s response to the three situations. France pushed 
forcefully for EU action in the CAR, which helps explain why the EU acted more decisively in this 
case than in the other two. France, however, was disappointed with the EU’s response, in which 
most other member states were unwilling to contribute to the CSDP mission. With respect to the 
Rohingyas in Myanmar, and South Sudan, the EU has been less active. This reflects not only the 
absence of  a strong policy entrepreneur within the EU but also the more difficult international 
Even if  the EU is unwilling or  
unable to intervene militarily in 
mass atrocity situations, it could 
still do more to make mass atrocity 
prevention a priority.
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context (with little support for action in the UN Security Council), and a very specific preference 
not to jeopardise political reform processes in Myanmar by condemning the government too 
forcefully. 
The UN Security Council is likely to become even less amenable to taking strong measures against 
governments or groups accused of  perpetrating mass atrocities. The apogee of  R2P may already 
have passed. But even if  the R2P norm fades away, mass atrocities will still exact a horrific human 
toll. They will also still generate large refugee flows, exacerbate instability and insecurity in 
surrounding regions, and hinder development and economic well-being in an even wider area. The 
UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, told a General Assembly debate on R2P in June 2018: 
“At this time of  extreme challenges, we must not abandon the responsibility to protect or leave it in 
a state of  suspended animation, finely articulated in words but breached time and again in practice  
. . . The credibility of  the international community, and above all the lives of  millions, rest on us” 
(United Nations Secretary-General, 2018). 
Even if  the EU is unwilling or unable to intervene militarily in mass atrocity situations, it could still 
do more to make mass atrocity prevention a priority of  its foreign relations. The least controversial 
aspect of  R2P is preventing mass atrocities. The EU could start with a clear high-level commitment 
to prevent atrocities both internally (within the EU) and externally. Five years ago, two observers 
argued that the EU member states and institutions need to have “an open and non-confrontational 
discussion” on the EU’s role in implementing R2P, and that the EU would need to show a sustained 
commitment to R2P for many years (Wouters and De Man, 2013). The time for such a discussion is 
ripe.
The EU could be quicker about responding to warning signs of  atrocities, and use diplomatic 
channels to signal its concern earlier. If  the EU is to maximise its strengths in prevention, then it is 
crucial that to respond to warnings at an earlier stage. The language used by the EU to describe 
atrocities could be stronger, naming the atrocities in line with the language used by reputable 
warners. This may come with a short-term political cost, but putting a spotlight on violators of  
international humanitarian law can help to prevent further atrocities, as it can generate internal and 
external opposition to further violations. Supporting local actors trying to prevent and stop 
atrocities should form a more explicit part of  the EU’s new ‘resilience agenda’. The EU could also 
be a stronger supporter of  ICC involvement in places such as Myanmar and South Sudan, as 
impunity for past atrocities is a risk factor for future atrocities. Such steps could reduce the gap 
between the EU’s rhetoric in support of  R2P and its implementation of  it, and help foster 
international support for R2P in the longer term.
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